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Abstract
Devices in mobile ad hoc networks work as network
nodes and relay packets originated by other nodes. Mo-
bile ad hoc networks can work properly only if the par-
ticipating nodes cooperate in routing and forwarding. For
individual nodes it might be advantageous not to cooper-
ate, though. The new routing protocol extensions presented
in this paper make it possible to detect and isolate misbe-
having nodes, thus making it unattractive to deny coopera-
tion. In the presented scheme, trust relationships and rout-
ing decisions are made based on experienced, observed, or
reported routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes.
A hybrid scheme of selective altruism and utilitarianism is
presented to strengthen mobile ad hoc network protocols in
their resistance to security attacks, while aiming at keeping
network throughput, or goodput, high. This paper focuses
particularly on the network layer, using the Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR) protocol as an example.
1. Introduction
Mobile ad hoc networks do not rely on any fixed infras-
tructure but communicate in a self-organized way. Their
properties lead to new vulnerabilities to attacks unknown
in infrastructure-based or wired networks. In this paper we
address these requirements for more fairness and robustness
of mobile ad hoc networks. An example of a mobile ad hoc
network is being developed within the Terminodes 1 project
[8] which is about large mobile ad hoc networks. It is differ-
ent from other mobile ad hoc networks as proposed in the
MANET (mobile ad hoc networks) working group of the
IETF [11] in that the network is a wide-area, self-organized
network. The wide area aspect raises scalability issues and,
1http://www.terminodes.org
furthermore, the Terminodes network is not limited to an or-
ganization who could enforce cooperation. Therefore, there
is a need for incentives to cooperate in order to encourage
the nodes to forward packets, although doing so consumes
their resources. The issues discussed in this paper are rele-
vant for both Terminodes and MANET-style mobile ad hoc
networks.
One of the protocols presented and discussed in the
MANET working group of the IETF is the Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR) protocol [9]. It is briefly presented in Sec-
tion 5 and serves as an example of security vulnerabilities
and what can be done to eliminate them. An extension to
DSR is proposed for this purpose.
1.1. Special Security Issues for Mobile Ad Hoc Net-
works
In addition to authentication, integrity, confidentiality,
availability, access control and non-repudiation (see [16] for
details), which have to be addressed differently in a mobile,
wireless, battery-powered and distributed environment, mo-
bile ad hoc networks raise the following security issues:
Cooperation and fairness: There is a trade-off between
good citizenship, i.e. cooperation, and resource con-
sumption, so nodes have to economize on their re-
sources. At the same time, however, if they do not
forward messages, others might not forward either,
thereby denying them service. Total non-cooperation
with other nodes and only exploiting their readiness to
cooperate is one of several boycotting behavior pat-
terns. Therefore, there has to be an incentive for a
node to forward messages that are not destined to it-
self. Attacks include incentive mechanism exploitation
by message interception, copying, or forging; incorrect
forwarding; and bogus routing advertisement.
Confidentiality of location: In some scenarios, for in-
stance in a military application, routing information
can be equally or even more important than the mes-
sage content itself [6].
No traffic diversion: Routes should be advertised and set
up adhering to the chosen routing protocol and should
truthfully reflect the knowledge of the topology of the
network. By diverting the traffic in the following ways,
nodes can work against that requirement:
Routing: To get information necessary for success-
ful malicious behavior, nodes can attract traffic
to themselves or their colluding nodes by means
of false routing advertisements. Although only
suitable for devices that have enough power, a lot
of information can be gathered this way by mali-
cious nodes for later use to enable more sophisti-
cated attacks.
Denial-of-service attacks can be achieved by bo-
gus routing information (injecting of incorrect
routing information or replay of old routing in-
formation or ‘black hole routes’ ) or by distort-
ing routing information to partition the network
or to load the network excessively, thus causing
retransmissions.
Forwarding: Nodes can decide to forward messages
to partners in collusion for analysis, disclosure,
or monetary benefits; or may decide not to for-
ward messages at all, thus boycotting communi-
cations.
1.2. Motivation for Attacks
The lack of infrastructure and organizational environ-
ment of mobile ad hoc networks offer special opportuni-
ties to attackers. Without proper security, it is possible to
gain various advantages by malicious behavior: better ser-
vice than cooperating nodes, monetary benefits by exploit-
ing incentive measures or trading confidential information;
saving power by selfish behavior, preventing someone else
from getting proper service, extracting data to get confiden-
tial information, and so on. In contrast, Section 3 provides
a rationale why cooperation can pay off.
1.3. Thwarting Attacks: Objectives
We would like to achieve the following effect with our
protocol: malicious behavior and non-cooperation should
be punished and should not pay off. Detection of this kind
of behavior is key but not the only point. The detection has
to lead to a reaction of other nodes such that it results in a
disadvantage for the malicious node. This punishment can
very well be by means of isolation, but not positive isolation
in being isolated from the society’s duties but above all the
society’s rights. Packets of malicious nodes should, upon
detection of the node being malicious, not be forwarded
by the normally behaving nodes. If, however, a node was
wrongly accused of being malicious or turns out to be a re-
penting criminal equivalent who is no longer malicious and
has behaved normally for a certain amount of time, some
sort of ‘re-socialization’ and re-integration into the network
communications should be possible.
Prevention, detection and reaction: According to
Schneier [14], a prevention-only strategy only works if the
prevention mechanisms are perfect; otherwise, someone
will find out how to get around them. Most of the attacks
and vulnerabilities have been the result of bypassing pre-
vention mechanisms. Given this reality, detection and re-
sponse are essential.
1.4. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Re-
lated work is discussed in Section 2, followed by a novel
approach to increase fairness, robustness and cooperation
which is motivated in Section 3, outlined as a protocol in
Section 4 and applied to DSR in Section 5. The rest of this
paper consists of an outline of future work in Section 6 and
the concluding Section 7.
2. Related Work
Anderson and Stajano [1] authenticate users by ‘im-
printing’ according to the analogy of ducklings acknowl-
edging the first moving subject they see as their mother,
but enabling the devices to be imprinted several times.
Haas employs threshold security, allowing for several cor-
rupted nodes or collusions [7]. Garcia-Luna-Aceves et al.
[15] looked at security of distance vector protocols in gen-
eral. For the Terminodes project, incentives to cooperate by
means of so-called nuglets [4] that serve as a per-hop pay-
ment in every packet have been suggested by Buttyan et al.
to ensure forwarding. The scheme suggested here in the fol-
lowing sections addresses additional issues in the network
layer such as traffic diversion.
Marti et al. [12] observed increased throughput in mo-
bile ad hoc networks by complementing DSR with a watch-
dog (for detection of malicious behavior) and a ‘pathrater’
(for trust management and routing policy, every used path is
rated), which enable nodes to avoid malicious nodes in their
routes. Their approach does not punish malicious nodes
that do not cooperate, but rather relieves them of the burden
of forwarding for others, whereas their messages are for-
warded without complaint. This way, the malicious nodes
are rewarded and reinforced in their behavior.
We would like to achieve the contrary, namely to make
only good behavior pay off in terms of service and reason-
able power consumption. With the scheme we present in
this paper, it is disadvantageous for nodes to behave ma-
liciously. An example of how this can work in biology is
presented subsequently.
3. Bearing Grudges: The Selfish Gene
As explained in Richard Dawkins’ ‘The Selfish Gene’
[5], reciprocal altruism is beneficial for every biological
system when favors are granted simultaneously, so there is
an intrinsic motivation for cooperation due to instant grati-
fication. The benefit of behaving well is not so obvious in
the case of a delay between granting a favor and repayment,
which is the case when, in mobile ad hoc networks, nodes
forward for each other. A biological example used in ‘The
Selfish Gene’ [5] explains the survival chances (and thus
gene selection) of birds grooming parasites off each other’s
head, which they cannot clean themselves.
Dawkins divides birds into two types: ‘suckers’ which
always help and ‘cheats’ which have other birds groom par-
asites off their head but fail to return the favor. In this sys-
tem, clearly the cheats have an advantage over the suckers,
but both are driven to extinction over time. Dawkins then
introduces a third kind of bird, the ‘grudger’ which starts
out being helpful to every bird, but bears a grudge against
those birds that do not return the favor and subsequently no
longer grooms their head.
According to Dawkins, simulation has shown that when
starting with a majority population of cheats and marginal
groups of both suckers and grudgers, the grudgers win over
time. Winning is defined as having the greatest benefit, as-
suming a cost for grooming another bird’s head and a profit
of having one’s head groomed, a loss leading to extinction
and profit leading to multiplication of the species. The ra-
tionale is as follows: The suckers help more than they get
favors due to the large number of cheats, so the number
of suckers decreases, while the number of cheats increases.
The grudgers also suffer from some loss, but less than the
suckers. Once the suckers are extinct, the grudgers grow
rapidly at the expense of the cheats, because they don’t help
a cheat twice and cheats are also not helped by other cheats.
After a while, the number of cheats decreases more slowly,
because the probability of a first-help by a grudger increases
with a higher population of grudgers. Over all, the popula-
tion of the grudgers grows, whereas the other species be-
come extinct.
4. Application and Improvements: The
Grudger Protocol
4.1. From Birds to Network Nodes
Defining suitable cost and profit to routing and forward-
ing favors and keeping a history of experiences with non-
cooperating nodes achieves the same as the grudger species,
driving the cheats out of business. In a very large ad hoc net-
work, convergence can be very slow, and keeping a history
of all bad experiences with other nodes equals large stor-
age requirements and long lists to go through. Therefore,
we suggest the following ideas, which are incorporated in a
protocol explained in the next section, to speed up the win-
ning of grudger nodes:
o learn from observed behavior: employ ‘neighborhood
watch’ to be warned by watching what happens to
other nodes in the neighborhood, before nodes have
to make a bad experience themselves,
o learn from reported behavior: share information of ex-
perienced malicious behavior with friends and learn
from them.
The metric for success is the resulting goodput, i.e. the
number of bits per unit of time forwarded to the correct des-
tination, minus any bits lost or retransmitted.
4.2. Components in Each Node
The protocol containing the improvements to the
grudger’s scheme consists of the following components as
shown in Figure 1: The Monitor, the Reputation System,
the Path Manager, and the Trust Manager. The com-
ponents are present in every node and they are described in
detail subsequently:
4.2.1 The Monitor (Neighborhood Watch)
In a networking environment, the nodes most likely to de-
tect non-compliant ‘criminal’ behavior are the nodes in the
vicinity of the criminal and in some cases the source and
the destination, if they detect unusual behavior or do not
get proper responses. The latter is not always the case, for
instance in the case of replay. One approach to protocol en-
forcement and detection of damaging behavior (intrusion,
misuse of cooperation incentives, denial of service, etc.)
suggested here is the equivalent of a ‘neighborhood watch’,
where nodes locally look for deviating nodes.
The neighbors of the neighborhood watch can detect de-
viances by the next node on the source route by either lis-
tening to the transmission of the next node or by observ-
ing route protocol behavior. By keeping a copy of a packet
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Figure 1. Trust architecture and finite state
machine within each node.
while listening to the transmission of the next node, any
content change can also be detected. In this paper we fo-
cussed on the detection of observable routing and forward-
ing misbehavior in DSR as listed in section 5.2. In general,
the following types of misbehavior can be indicated:
o no forwarding (of control messages nor data),
o unusual traffic attraction (advertises many very good
routes or advertises routes very fast, so they are
deemed good routes),
o route salvaging (i.e. rerouting to avoid a broken link),
although no error has been observed,
o lack of error messages, although an error has been ob-
served,
o unusually frequent route updates,
o silent route change (tampering with the message
header of either control or data packets).
As a component within each node, the monitor registers
these deviations of normal behavior. As soon as a given
bad behavior occurs, the reputation system is called.
4.2.2 The Trust Manager
In an ad hoc environment, trust management has to be dis-
tributed and adaptive [2]. This component deals with in-
coming and outgoing ALARM messages. ALARM mes-
sages are sent by the trust manager of a node to warn oth-
ers of malicious nodes. Incoming ALARMS originate from
outside friends, whereas outgoing ALARMS are generated
by the node itself after having experienced, observed or
been reported malicious behavior. The following functions
are performed by the trust manager:
o Trust function to calculate trust levels,
o Trust table entries management for trust level adminis-
tration,
o Forwarding of ALARM messages,
o Filtering of incoming ALARM messages according to
the trust level of the reporting node.
A mechanism similar to the trust management in Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) for key validation and certification is
used here for mobile ad hoc networks for trust management
for routing and forwarding. In PGP [18], several levels of
trust can be expressed, e.g. ‘unknown’, ‘none’, ‘marginal’,
and ‘complete’. When PGP is calculating the validity of a
public key, it examines the trust level of all the attached cer-
tifying signatures. It computes a weighted score of validity.
For example, two marginally trusted signatures might be
deemed credible as one completely trusted signature. The
weighting scheme is adjustable to require a different num-
ber of marginally trusted signatures to judge a key as valid.
The trust manager consists of the following components:
o Alarm table containing information about received
alarms,
o Trust table managing trust levels for nodes,
o Friends list containing all friends a node sends alarms
to.
The trust manager administers a table of friends, i.e.
nodes that are candidates to receive ALARM messages
from a given node, and how much they are trusted. Trust
is important when making a decision about the following
issues:
o providing or accepting routing information,
o accepting a node as part of a route,
o taking part in a route originated by some other node.
4.2.3 The Reputation System (Node Rating)
Reputation systems are used in some online auctioning sys-
tems. They provide a means of obtaining a quality rating
of participants of transactions by having both the buyer and
the seller give each other feedback on how their activities
were perceived and evaluated. For a detailed explanation of
reputation systems see Resnick et al. [13].
In order to avoid centralized rating, local rating lists
and/or black lists are maintained at each node and poten-
tially exchanged with friends. The nodes can include black
sheep in the route request to be avoided for routing, which
also alarms nodes on the way. Nodes can look up senders
in the black list containing the nodes with bad rating before
forwarding anything for them. The problem of how to dis-
tinguish alleged from proven malicious nodes and thus how
to avoid false accusations can be lessened by timeout and
subsequent recovery or revocation lists of nodes that have
behaved well for a specified period of time. Another prob-
lem is scalability and how to avoid blown-up lists, which
can also be addressed by timeouts.
The reputation system in this protocol manages a table
consisting of entries for nodes and their rating. The rating
is changed only when there is enough evidence for mali-
cious behavior that is significant for a node and that has
occurred a number of times exceeding a threshold to rule
out coincidences. The rating is then changed according to
a rate function that assigns different weights to the type of
behavior detection:
o Own experience: greatest weight,
o Observations: smaller weight,
o Reported experience: weight function according to
PGP trust.
Once the weight has been determined, the entry of the
node that misbehaved is changed accordingly. If the rat-
ing of a node in the table has deteriorated so much as to
fall out of a tolerable range, the path manager is called for
action. Bearing in mind that malicious behavior will hope-
fully be the exception and not the rule, the reputation system
is built on negative experience rather than positive impres-
sions. The questions of positive change and timeout are still
to be addressed in detail.
4.2.4 The Path Manager
The path manager performs the following functions:
o Path re-ranking according to security metric,
o Deletion of paths containing malicious nodes,
o Action on receiving a request for a route from a mali-
cious node (e.g. ignore, do not send any reply) ,
o Action on receiving request for a route containing a
malicious node in the source route (e.g. also ignore,
alert the source).
4.3. Information Flow in Each Node
As shown in Figure 1, each node monitors the behavior
of its next hop neighbors. If a suspicious event is detected,
the information is given to the reputation system. If the
event is significant for the node, as defined initially for the
type of node, for different nodes can have different security
requirements, it is checked whether the event has occurred
more often than a predefined threshold high enough to dis-
tinguish deliberate malicious behavior from simple coinci-
dences such as collisions. If that occurrence threshold is
exceeded, the reputation system updates the rating of the
node that caused that event. If the rating subsequently turns
out to be intolerable, the information is passed on to the path
manager that proceeds to delete all routes containing the in-
tolerable node from the path cache. The node continues to
monitor the neighborhood and an ALARM message is sent
as described in the next subsection.
4.4. Information Flow Between Nodes
In order to convey warning information, an ALARM
message is sent by the trust manager component. This
message contains the type of protocol violation, the num-
ber of occurrences observed, whether the message was self-
originated by the sender, the address of the reporting node,
the address of the observed node and the destination address
(either the source of the route or the address of a friend that
might be interested).
When the monitor component of a node receives such
an ALARM message, it passes it on to the trust man-
ager, where the source of the message is evaluated. If the
source is at least partially trusted, the table containing the
ALARMs is updated. If there is enough evidence that the
node reported in the ALARM is malicious, the information
is sent to the reputation system where it is again evaluated
for significance, number of occurrences and accumulated
reputation of the node as explained in Section 4.3. Enough
evidence means that either the source of the ALARM is
fully trusted or that several partially trusted nodes have re-
ported the same and their respective assigned trust adds up
to a value of one entirely trusted node or more.
Authentication is a prerequisite for the protocol to work
and assumed to exist here. One way to achieve authentica-
tion is by using PGP along with distributed certification au-
thorities. Without authentication, nodes can denounce each
other at will and a trust management scheme is not feasible.
5. Extension to DSR
5.1. The DSR Protocol
Dynamic Source Routing is a protocol developed for
routing in mobile ad hoc networks and was proposed for
MANET by Broch, Johnson and Maltz at Carnegie Mellon
University [9]. In a nutshell, it works as follows: Nodes
send out a ROUTE REQUEST message, all nodes that re-
ceive this message forward it to their neighbors and put
themselves into the source route unless they have received
the same request before. If a receiving node is the destina-
tion, or has a route to the destination, it does not forward
the request, but sends a REPLY message containing the full
source route. It may send that reply along the source router
in reverse order or issue a ROUTE REQUEST including
the route to get back to the source, if the former is not pos-
sible due to asymmetric links. ROUTE REPLY messages
can be triggered by ROUTE REQUEST messages or gra-
tuitous. After receiving one or several routes, the source
picks the best (by default the shortest), stores it, and sends
messages along that path. In general, the better the route
metrics (number of hops, delay, bandwidth or other criteria)
and the sooner the REPLY arrived at the source (indication
of a short path - the nodes are required to wait a time corre-
sponding to the length of the route they can advertise before
sending it in order to avoid a storm of replies), the higher the
preference given to the route and the longer it will stay in
the cache. In case of a link failure, the node that can not
forward the packet to the next node sends an error message
towards the source. Routes that contain a failed link, can
‘salvage’ the route by bypassing the bad link.
5.2. Attacking DSR
We found the following ways of attacking DSR, target-
ing availability, integrity, confidentiality, non-repudiation,
authentication, access control or any combination thereof:
1) Incorrect forwarding: acknowledge ROUTE RE-
QUEST, send new request or do not forward at all.
This works only until upper layers find out.
2) Bogus routing information or traffic attraction: reply
to ROUTE REQUEST, also gratuitous, to advertise a
non-existent or wrong route.
3) Salvage a route that is not broken. If the salvage bit is
not set, it will look like the source is still the original
one.
4) Choose a very short reply time, so the route will be
prioritized and stay in the cache longer.
5) Set good metrics of bogus routes for priority and re-
maining time in the cache.
6) Manipulate flow metrics for the same reason.
7) Do not send error messages in order to prevent other
nodes from looking for alternative routes.
8) Use bogus routes to attract traffic to intercept packets
and gather information.
9) Use promiscuous mode to listen in on traffic destined
for another node.
10) Cause a denial-of-service attack caused by overload by
sending route updates at short intervals.
5.3. Detection of Attacks in DSR
With the exception of the promiscuous listening in 9), all
of the attacks listed above correspond to observable events
the monitor component in each node can detect either at
once or at the latest when they happen repeatedly:
1) Forwarding: this can be detected by passive acknowl-
edgement, i.e. keeping a copy of a packet until having
confirmed correct forwarding by listening to the trans-
mission of the next hop node.
2), 8) Bogus routing: a strong indication would be when
an intermediate node sees itself advertised on a route
it does not have. As a last resort, if a node cannot tell
whether a route is real or bogus, it can at least detect
the lack of forwarding as in 1). Unusually increased
frequency of route advertising can be detected as in
10).
3) Salvaging: indicated by the reception of a salvaged
packet without having received a link error message
first.
4) Reply time too short: can be detected by comparing
reply time to actual route length.
5), 6) Metrics of bogus routes too good: detectable by com-
paring metrics to actual quality.
7) Lack of error messages: indicated in the case when a
node receives a link error message from its own link
layer but no explicit error message by other nodes in
the range.
10) Route updates too frequent: detectable by keeping
timestamp of last update to compare.
Depending on the type of device, some events may be
less important such that the effort to monitor and detect
these particular events may be omitted.
5.4. Grudging Nodes in DSR
The suggested scheme works as an extension to a rout-
ing protocol. In this example, normal DSR information
flow (ROUTE REQUEST, ROUTE REPLY messages) as
explained in Section 5 takes place. Once non-cooperative
behavior has been detected and exceeds threshold values,
an ALARM message is sent. Figures 2 through 5 show the
flow of messages and data from route discovery to the de-
tection of malicious behavior and subsequent rerouting. In
more detail:
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Figure 2 shows DSR route discovery for a path from
node A to node E. Every node forwards the request to its
neighbors unless it has already received the same route re-
quest or has a path cache entry for the desired destination.
Figure 3 shows the reply messages of the destination
node itself, node E, and from node D, which has a path
to E. The reply message contains the reversed source route
to the destination and is sent to the source. In the case of
unidirectional links, or if generally the route can not be re-
versed, node E would send the reply along a path to A that
it has in its route cache. If there is no path to A in the route
cache, E has to perform a route discovery itself to get to A.
In this route request, the already found path from A to E is
included.
In Figure 4 data flow is from node A to node E via node
C and D. In this case, node A has chosen this route accord-
ing to some metrics and preferred it over the route via B.
During the data flow, node C detects that node D does not
behave correctly. In this example, node D does not forward
the data destined for node E. After the occurrence of the bad
behavior of node D was observed by node C for a number
exceeding a threshold, node C triggers an ALARM mes-
sage to be sent to the source, node A. Upon reception of the
ALARM message as shown in Figure 5, node A acknowl-
edges the message to the reporting node C and decides to
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Figure 4. Data flow and alarm: A sends data and
receives an ALARM from C that D does not forward.
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Figure 5. Act on alarm: reroute: A uses an
alternate path to E.
use the alternate path via node B to send the data to the des-
tination node E.
5.5. Analysis
Detailed simulations in GloMoSim [17] are under way,
see [3] for a sketch of the simulation design and methodol-
ogy. Preliminary results have shown that even if the DSR
protocol is only fortified by reacting to forwarding defec-
tion, in the presence of malicious nodes only the first few
packets are dropped (according to the defined threshold plus
the time it takes to react) in the fortified version of DSR,
whereas all of the packets are dropped using the normal de-
fenseless DSR protocol. For analytical evaluation we are in-
vestigating the use of Game Theory. The increased security
will come at the price of some overhead, the exact amount
of which is being investigated and simulated, but inherently
the price of no communication at all due to malicious nodes
is higher than any overhead by one extra message in the
protocol,the ALARM message.
6. Future Work - Next Steps
The next steps will consist of implementing more of the
approaches discussed so far in simulations for evaluation
and performance analysis. The focus is on finding a sus-
tainable relationship between the total number of nodes in
the network, the number of malicious nodes that can be tol-
erated and the number of friends per node needed to achieve
that. We are analyzing the scalability, the cost/benefit ratio,
and the goodput increase and overhead for achieving secu-
rity as defined in this paper.
We will look at further issues that have not been ad-
dressed in this paper, for instance what happens to a node in
a remote location, where friends might be far away, or how
to deal with colluding nodes. Other interesting issues in-
clude rumor spreading and transitive trust in a ‘small world’
[10] and how it could be used to locate friends.
7. Conclusions
Mobile ad hoc networks exhibit new vulnerabilities to
security attacks. As opposed to traditional networks, mo-
bile ad hoc networks do not rely on any infrastructure and
central authorities, they can be highly dynamic and mobile
and operate over unreliable wireless media. When design-
ing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks, special care has
to be taken to include security mechanisms for the increased
requirements in this environment. New ways of distribut-
ing trust can be implemented by introducing the notion of
friends and making their cooperation pay off. This paper
identifies the special requirements of mobile ad hoc net-
work security, robustness, and fairness, and it introduces
a scheme to cope with them by retaliating for malicious
behavior and warning affiliated nodes to avoid bad expe-
riences. Nodes learn not only from their own experience,
but also from observing the neighborhood and from the ex-
perience of their friends. Observable attacks on forwarding
and routing can be thwarted by the suggested scheme of de-
tection, alerting and reaction. Security is a major challenge
for mobile ad hoc networks, because good citizenship can
not be assumed in an open world, where anyone can join the
network. Depending on the extent to which the security is-
sues are addressed, people might be reluctant to use mobile
ad hoc networks.
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